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PRIORITIES: II* 
Edgar N. Durfee 
BoNA FIDE PURCHASE, cont'd. 
Bona Fide Purchase of Money. The equity rule, with its dis-
crimination between legal and equitable interests, occupies such a 
conspicuous place on the stage that a student is in some danger of 
acquiring the notion that this is the whole measure of bona fide 
purchase. There is even reason to think that experienced laivyers 
and judges have sometimes too readily assumed that a purchaser 
who can't make good on the equity rule must fail. But there are 
other rules of bona fide purchase which make nothing of the 
distinction between legal and equitable interests. The outstanding 
case is that of money. Here a purchaser (including, in this case, 
the transferee for antecedent value) in good faith (and here con-
structive notice is a low hurdle) from any possessor gets good 
title. It matters not whether the transferor has legal title subject 
only to a trust or an equitable lien, or is a thief having only that 
possessory title which is said to be good against all persons except 
the true owner. 
Bona Fide Purchase of Negotiable Paper. Here the distinction 
between legal and equitable interests is as irrelevant as in the 
case of money. There are, however, several points in which the 
purchaser of negotiable paper is in a weaker position than the 
purchaser of money. (1) There is in this case more room for the 
doctrine of constructive notice, sub nom. "bad faith." The dif-
ference, however, is on the fact side,-a negotiable instrument 
carries part of its personal history on its face. (2) The transferor 
must have a good "paper title" in this sense, that the instru-
ment must be payable to bearer or to the order of the transferor, 
either by virtue of its original form or by virtue of genuine, not 
forged, endorsement. In other words, one can not be a holder in 
due course if he traces title through a forged endorsement. Might 
estoppel help him out if he could show negligence on the part of 
the person whose endorsement was forged? (3) It may be essential 
• This is the second part of "Priorities" (also known as "Little Nemo") which was 
taken from Professor Durfee's teaching materials. The first part was published in the 
February issue-which was dedicated to the memory of Professor Durfee.-Ed. 
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that the paper be taken before maturity, but the question is 
debatable both on authority and on principle. (4) Until N.I.L. 
there -iyas a distinction in the definition of value. 
Side-Show: Defenses to Negotiable Paper. These remarks about 
bona fide purchase of negotiable paper have to do with the 
priority problem,-the question what title the purchaser gets 
where his transferor has something less than the title he purports 
to transfer. That is all that logically belongs under the heading 
"Priorities." But it will be convenient to go one step afield to con-
sider the effect of bona fide purchase upon the obligations of the 
parties whose names appear upon the paper as makers, drawers, 
acceptors or endorsers. The common statement is that bona fide 
purchase cuts off personal defenses, but not real defenses, or the 
distinction may be put in terms of equitable defenses and legal 
defenses. The real defenses are such as are thought of as going 
to the basic requirements of contract obligation, viz. (1) capacity 
to contract (e.g. infancy is a real defense); (2) a genuine promise, 
whether expressed as in the case of the maker of a note, or implied 
as in the case of blank endorsement ( e.g. forgery, and alteration 
which is a sort of forgery, are real defenses); and intent to promise 
(e.g. that extraordinary type of fraud, sometimes called fraud 
in esse contractus and sometimes called fraud in factum, is a real 
defense, herein admitting to the law some measure of the subjec-
tive theory of contract). The personal defenses are such as are 
thought of as going merely to the justice of enforcing the promise, 
the notable examples being, (1) fraud, mistake and duress of the 
common sorts, which merely go to the inducement of the promise; 
(2) failure of consideration, meaning, ordinarily, breach of con-
tract by promisee; and (3) payment. 
Purchase of negotiable paper after maturity will not cut off 
any defenses, however perfect the good faith and the value. It 
is sometimes said that the paper ceases to be negotiable at ma-
turity, but this is dubious doctrine because, as previously in-
dicated, there is authority for the position that a bona fide pur-
chaser after maturity gets good title to the instrument. There 
seems to be no good reason why the purchaser should not get as 
good title as if the paper had been immature, though a fair reason 
for holding that he takes subject to all defenses, viz. that non-
payment at maturity suggests that there may have been a good 
reason for nonpayment-in other words puts the purchaser on in-
quiry concerning defenses. 
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What do you think about the justice and policy of the law 
merchant? Here the judges have talked a great deal about policy, 
but seldom to voice any idea except that of facilitating the circu-
lation of commercial paper, enabling it to function as money. 
Query how far it is possible, under present conditions, for the 
paper of merchants to function as money? And how far is that 
desirable? And do you not see other reasons for protection of pur-
chasers of commercial paper? 
Bona Fide Purchase of Non-Negotiable Obligations. This 
heading covers much ground. It includes tort obligations, which 
are not only non-negotiable but are, sometimes at least, non-as-
signable. It also includes obligations under bilaterally executory 
contract, which introduce difficulties with respect to assignability, 
and some others. Let us simplify by confining our discussion to 
purchase of non-negotiable debts, with the understanding that 
the same principles are applicable to other non-negotiable obliga-
tions, at least to the extent that in no other case can the bona fide 
purchaser occupy a more favorable position than in the case of the 
debt. 
It will be convenient to consider first the position of the pur-
chaser with respect to defenses of the obligor, meaning, of course, 
the supposed obligor. It is a familiar formula that the assignee 
stands in the shoes of his assignor, and all the mud on the shoes 
goes with them. Defenses available against the assignor are avail-
able against the assignee. Of course, an assignee can make out an 
estoppel in some cases,-e.g. where he has made inquiry of the 
obligor before purchasing. Could he estop the obligor merely on 
the fact that the latter has put into the hands of the assignor an 
instrument which evidences an obligation? 
No distinction is drawn between real and personal defenses, but 
we do distinguish between defenses arising before and defenses 
arising after the obligor receives notice of the assignment. There 
are not many defenses that can arise after the initial transaction, 
but one thinks of payment, accord and satisfaction, and set-off. 
How about failure of consideration, meaning nonperformance 
of counter-promise? Would it make any difference when that hap-
pened? Must we not think about two factors: (1) the date when 
the defense arises, with reference to notice of the assignment, and 
(2) the obligor's freedom of action? Don't we have here a relative 
of the last clear chance rule? 
Turning from the problem of defenses (the assignee's position 
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as against the obligor) to the problem of priority (the assignee's 
position as against adverse claimants of the chose) we again meet 
the formula that the assignee stands in the assignor's shoes. Here 
the equity rule of bona fide purchase is wholly inapplicable,-for 
example, in the case of assignment by a trustee of a chose in ac-
tion. This can be given a neat historical explanation. The rights 
of assignees were first worked out in chancery. At that stage, the 
assignee could not get legal ownership of the chose and therefore, 
under the equity rule of bona fide purchase, could not prevail over 
the prior equity. Though the law now recognizes the assignee as 
owner (except, in some states, for the formal requirement of suit 
in the name of the assignor) the old-shoes rule has survived. Query 
whether there are policy factors (in other words, whether there is 
anything more than historical accident) in the discrimination be-
tween goods and debts? 
Little Nemo has almost complete sway in the debt cases, but 
is not quite absolute monarch. Chancellor Kent fathered the doc-
trine that, although an assignee takes subject to "equities" of the 
obligor, he does not take subject to "latent equities" of third 
persons, if he gives value without notice.26 What was the big idea? 
Why "latent"? Kent's doctrine was afterward repudiated in New 
York, but it has been accepted in several states. Query what cases 
it applies to, other than that of prior trust, which was the case 
before the great chancellor? Suppose the purchaser's assignor is 
himself an assignee, and has practiced fraud on his assignor? And, 
particularly, does Kent's rule apply to that very interesting case 
of successive assignments of the same chose by the same assignor 
to two (or more) assignees? The editor has never seen it so applied. 
But, for that case, there is another qualifying rule, accepted in 
England and some of our states, preferring the later assignee if 
he is the first to give notice to the obligor.27 But, again, query 
just what may be the limits of this rule? 
There are some other rules which may help out the bona fide 
purchaser under certain circumstances; e.g. when the chose is 
embodied in a tangible instrument which the assignor delivers 
to him; e.g. when he has collected the obligation, or has got 
judgment on it. Should these exceptional rulings (preferring the 
26 Murray v. Lylbum, 2 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 441 (1817). 
27 Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. I and 48, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 and 486 (1828). 
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assignee over prior claimants) be regarded as products of analogi-
cal reasoning from the equity rule as to purchase of the legal estate'! 
Or should we look for origins in that large loose principle of estop-
pel? Of course, there may be place for estoppel in this field: for 
example, if the purchaser before making the purchase inquired of 
the adverse claimant, etc. How far will the principle carry? Can 
we say that the cestui is estopped because he allowed his trustee 
to be clothed with apparent title? And how about the defrauded 
assignor of the assignor? 
Bona Fide Purchase of Corporate Stock. Corporate stock is 
often spoken of as a chose in action, but it is in many respects 
unique. It cannot, in this brief sketch of priorities, be dealt with 
further than to say that the certificate of stock has been given 
quasi-negotiability. Notably, bona fide purchase may cut off prior 
legal interests. Statutes have a place in this picture. 
Bona Fide Purchase of Chattels: Cases Beyond the Equity 
Rule. Returning to chattels, how far can we get beyond the 
equity rule? The primary question will concern those limits of the 
equity rule which are stated in terms of legal and equitable 
interests. 
A. Vendor Has a Voidable Title. A purchaser who practices 
fraud of the ordinary sort ( e.g. misrepresenting his credit, or giv-
ing the seller a rubber check) gets but a voidable title, yet his bona 
fide subpurchaser gets good title. It is sometimes thought to be a 
sufficient reconciliation of such cases with the primary canon of 
priority to merely point to the fact that the first purchaser had 
a title, though voidable. But a good faith purchaser from one who 
has voidable title is not always protected. An infant's sale is merely 
voidable, not void, yet under the common law (but see Uniform 
Sales Act, section 24), the infant can rescind as against the good 
faith subpurchaser. Williston says that the right to rescind for 
fraud is "essentially equitable," while the infant's right to rescind 
is given by "law as distinguished from equity."28 This is obviously 
an attempt to fit the cases to the equity rule of bona fide pur-
chase. It goes smoothly enough so far as concerns the infant, for 
his right is clearly of ancient common law origin, but the going 
28 WILLISTON, SALES §348. [The references to Williston on Sale.s evidently are to the 
second edition (1924), but the section numbers pertinent to this article are the same 
in the current edition.-Ed.] 
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is not so good on the other side, as Williston himself apparently 
realized since he used the guarded expression, "essentially equi-
table." In fact, rescission by the defrauded vendor of chattels (in 
contrast to the parallel case of land) is worked out at law in trover 
and replevin, and relief will not be given in equity unless there 
are peculiar difficulties in the legal remedies.29 And the oldest 
cases which the editor has seen do not suggest an equitable deri-
vation of the protection of the bona fide purchaser. Parker v. 
Patrick30 seems to assume that every bona fide purchaser of goods 
is to be protected except where the ancient larceny statute31 gives 
the owner the right of restitution upon conviction of the thief. 
The assumption does not, of course, hold much common law 
water. Mowrey v. Walsh32 distinguished the fraud case from theft 
and bailment cases in that, in the former case, by the "voluntary 
delivery" of the defrauded vendor to the fraudulent vendee, "the 
property was changed," though the transaction was voidable as 
against the wrongdoer. This looks like an assumption that a good 
faith purchaser from one who has voidable title is to be protected, 
but we have seen that the infancy case will not rhyme with that 
proposition. 
Perhaps these cases, and some others not heretofore considered, 
can be reduced to a coherent analytical scheme. A bona fide pur-
chaser gets good title as against a prior legal claim if his transferor, 
or a more remote party in his chain of title, obtained a transfer 
from the prior claimant involving certain juristic elements, viz.: 
capacity to make an absolute transfer and intent to make an 
absolute transfer. The requirement of capacity is not satisfied by 
infant or lunatic, who can not transfer more than a voidable title. 
The requirement of intent is not satisfied by theft nor by bail-
ment. And there has been much judicial thinking along these 
lines. Duress, fraud and mistake, in their ordinary forms, do not 
preclude intent to make a transfer but merely create a false motive 
for that intent. Therefore a transfer so induced gives a title such 
that a bona fide purchaser from the transferee is protected. But 
it is otherwise with duress, fraud or mistake in those extraordin-
29 Id., §567. 
30 5 T. R. 175, 101 Eng. Rep. 99 (1793). 
31 21 Hen. 8, c. 11 (1529). 
32 8 Cow. (N.Y.) 238 (1828). 
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ary forms which are thought of as precluding intent to make a 
transfer, or at least precluding intent to make a transfer to the 
person through whom the bona fide purchaser claims. Do you 
remember Cundy v. Lindsay,33 where Blenkarn, the rascal who 
got the goods, was mistaken for the respectable Blenkiron, and 
Rodliff v. Dallinger,34 where the villain who got the goods was 
supposed to represent an undisclosed principal? In both cases the 
defrauded seller recovered from the bona fide subpurchaser on 
the theory that he had never intended to transfer title to the crook. 
In the latter case, Holmes, J., distinguished the situation where a 
vendee "being identified by the senses and dealt with as the person 
so identified, says that he is A, when in fact he is B"; there, he 
said, the fraud "goes to the motive for making the contract, not 
to its existence."35 If you attempt to harmonize these decisions, 
still more if you should have occasion to apply this common law 
subtlety to the facts of a case out of court (that is, before you have 
a judicial finding of the particular variety of intent entertained 
by the seller, which will usually mean a jury finding under in-
structions elucidating the refinements of the law) you will probably 
be ready to exchange your common law birth right for any 
rule that would be workable. And, if you think about this problem 
critically, you may feel that we have at this point come perilously 
close to the discredited subjective theory of contract. 
Does the common law have the virtue of consistency? Judge 
Holmes' distinction between the "formal constituents of a legal 
transaction" and the "motives" inducing a transaction, is sub-
stantially the distinction which we found in the classification of 
real and personal defenses of the parties to commercial paper. 
But note that the analogy to the law merchant is not as perfect 
as you might wish; it is good so far as concerns defenses to actions 
on the contract obligations of the parties, but not so good with 
respect to the more nearly analogous problem of priority of title 
to the paper, for the endorsement of infant or lunatic gives good 
title to the holder in due course.36 
Our discussion has been put in terms of purchase and sub-
33 3 App. Cas. 459 (1878). 
34141 Mass. 1, 4 N.E. 805 (1886). 
35 For other cases, in plenty, see WILLISTON, SALF.S §635. , 
36 See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 5th ed., 277 et seq., 559 et seq. (1932). 
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purchase, or sale and resale, but the rules of law are, of course, 
broader than that. They apply as well to sale followed by pledge 
or mortgage to B.F.P. Would they not equally apply to pledge 
or mortgage followed by foreclosure sale to B.F.P.? Would they 
not, indeed, apply to any series of transactions which would give 
a good title to the ultimate purchaser in the absence of the flaw 
in the first transaction resulting from want of capacity, fraud, etc.? 
B. Vendor Has Possession but No Other Title. In the false 
inducement (duress, fraud and mistake) cases, the theory on which 
we protect the bona :fide purchaser of goods is that his transferor 
had "a title," some kind of title. But in early English law pos-
session was nearly the whole title, so that a disseisor of land or chat-
tels could be said to have the property, while the disseisee had 
but a right of action. Even today, we say that possession is owner-
ship as against all the world except the one with better title. Might 
we not, then, expect protection of the bona fide purchaser from 
one in possession, especially in the case of chattels where men 
commonly assume ownership in the possessor and make no in-
quiry as to his title? The civil law of modern Europe starts from 
the position that a good faith purchaser from one in possession 
of goods gets title. Possession vaut titre. To this rule, exceptions 
are admitted. But, as we have seen, our law starts with "the fun-
damental principle of property which secures the title of the 
original owner against wrongful disposition by another." We 
also admit exceptions to the rule, and the two bodies of law might 
conceivably come to the same results, but that would hardly 
, be expected by anyone who realizes how much the mode of ap-
proach to a problem influences conclusions. The civil law centers 
attention on the position of the purchaser and the appearance pre-
sented to him by possession, while Anglo-American law centers 
attention on the position of the prior owner and then naturally 
emphasizes his conduct rather than the "wrongful disposition by 
another." 
It would be too much to say that our law is oblivious to the 
significance of possession. If one claims to have purchased in 
go~d faith and it appears that his transferor did not have posses-
sion (neither possession of the goods nor possession of a document 
of title such as a bill of lading, which is said to give constructive 
possession and which we shall find to be at least as important to 
the purchaser as physical possession) the purchaser's good faith is 
impugned. On this side, we have given abundant effect to pas-
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session, and have done so in every class of cases-land, goods, ne-
gotiable paper, choses in action, and under all the rules of bona 
fide purchase. Perhaps this constructive notice factor is stronger 
in one type of case than another, but the differences are not con-
spicuous. Turn the question around, however-ask what we do 
for the good faith purchaser from one who had possession, and 
the answer must be that we throw him out of court, with ex-
ceptions. Here the differences between case and case are extreme. 
One who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser of land and showed 
nothing but his vendor's possession would not even get to bat. On 
the other hand, as we have noted, a good faith purchaser of money 
from a possessor scores a home run. With the case of chattels, 
no short statement is possible. We must distinguish several situa-
tions and several distinct rules of law. 
I. English Law of Market Overt. Let us first consider the 
English law of market overt. A bona fide purchaser of goods in 
any public market or fair (and by local custom this includes every 
shop in the city of London) gets good title, subject to certain con-
ditions which we need not discuss further than to say that it makes 
no difference whether the seller has legal title or equitable title 
or voidable title or no title at all, and it is immaterial whether 
the former owner voluntarily parted with possession or suffered 
loss or theft, except for the operation of the larceny statute which 
applies only upon conviction of the thief. Our colonial fore-
fathers seem to have thought that this piece of the common law 
was unsuited to our conditions, for they did not bring it with 
them in the Mayflower. 
2. Lost or Stolen Goods. Of course the equities of the owner, 
as against the bona fide purchaser, vary. The case of lost or stolen 
goods is different from the case of goods entrusted by the owner 
to the possession of one who proves faithless. French law makes a 
sharp distinction here. Possession vaut titre does not apply to lost 
or stolen goods. Whether there are other rules which might reach 
some of these cases, the editor does not know. German law is in 
about the same shape. In our law, market overt being eliminated, 
the title to lost or stolen goods is not cut off by bona fide pur-
chase, except (I) in cases involving negotiable documents of title, 
which will be discussed hereinafter, and (2) in certain cases where 
possession is a sufficient foundation for a paramount lien for 
carriage, storage, repair, etc., hereinbefore referred to, and (3) 
possibly but improbably in case of negligence of the owner which 
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would found estoppel. In these cases of lost or stolen goods, it 
appears to be wholly immaterial whether the purchase is from an 
established dealer or from a casual vendor. 
3. Bailed Goods. The major problem concerns the case where 
the owner has entrusted possession to another. If it is an equitable 
trust, a bona fide purchaser of the legal title prevails. If it is 
merely a bailment, with or without some variety of agency, one 
might expect the same result to be reached upon analogy, es-
pecially in view of the fact that in chattel cases the appearance 
to the purchaser is the same.37 Such is the result reached in French 
(and German?) law, as you might anticipate in view of their ap-
proach to the problem. But Anglo-American law, looking prima-
rily to the position of the prior owner and insisting that the pur-
chaser claiming an exception "must come within all the condi-
tions on which it depends," has distinguished trust from trust. 
If, then, the trust proves to be of the common law variety rather 
than the equity variety (that point may itself be a legal battle) 
and the case does not fall within the exceptions noted for lost 
and stolen goods (which would, of ccmrse, be at least as good 
here) the purchaser has an uphill fight. 
In the famous case of Pickering v. Busk,38 Lord Ellenborough 
attempted an extension of- market overt, though limited to cases 
of trusting. He argued that, when goods are delivered by the 
owner to a person whose ordinary business is sale of such goods, 
authority to sell is to be presumed. It is pretty clear that he meant 
that authority to sell is to be conclusively presumed, and meant to 
37 Note some of the differences between land and goods. The purchaser of land 
normally examines title, and our methods of effecting transfer of land (referring to the 
total scheme, product of common law, equity and statute) are such that there are rela-
tively few defects in a vendor's title which are not, on the one hand disclosed, or, on 
the other hand, cured either by the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase or by the 
operation of the recording acts. In the case of chattels, however, our methods of effecting 
transfer are much more informal, and the recording acts are much more limited in 
scope, usually applying only to mortgages and some other security transactions, and even 
in the cases to which they apply they are much less informative, because, for instance, 
of obstacles to accurate description of goods. The result is that there are many more 
situations where defects in vendor's title will neither be disclosed •by examination nor 
cured by the equity rule or the recording acts. It should, of course, ·be added, that the 
chattel sale is much more likely to be one where the traffic would not bear the cost of 
title examination, even if examination would be effective protection. Net result, pur-
chasers of chattels rely, indeed must rely, much more on possession than purchasers of 
land. 
38 15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 758 (1812). 
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include the case of simple bailment for safekeeping or repair. He 
apparently felt that authority to pledge should equally be pre-
sumed, but he referred to a case where a factor with authority 
to sell was held to have no power to pledge, and treated that case 
as distinguishable. It should be noted, however, that the other 
judges, concurring in the result, placed the decision on the ground 
that, in the absence of evidence of express limitation on the seller's 
authority, the jury were warranted in finding actual authority to 
sell, in which view of the case they regarded it as a material cir-
cumstance that the seller was a factor or broker whose ordinary 
business was the sale of goods for others. Lord Ellenborough alone 
adopted the point of view of the purchaser, who "can only look 
to the acts of the parties, and to the external indicia of property, 
and not to the private communications which may pass between 
a principal and his broker," and even he relied in part on the 
peculiar indicia of ownership which, in the case before him, 
the owner had conferred upon the seller by having the goods en-
tered in the latter's name in the warehouse. Altogether, this an-
cient case gives a very broad hint of the present state of the com-
mon law. Lord Ellenborough's purchaser-centric views have never 
prevailed, and the case is disposed of as a problem in the authority 
of the bailee, qua agent. 
4. Agency, Implied and Constructive. We have, of course, a 
concept of "apparent authority," which at times seems to embody 
an estoppel idea and get us beyond the actual authority conferred 
on the bailee, but there is much confusion here between construc-
tive authority, based on estoppel, and authority implied in fact, 
so that it is often impossible to say whether a reported decision 
rests on the one or the other. The very use of the term "authority," 
though coupled with the term "apparent," has focused attention 
on the owner's conduct rather than on the position of the pur-
chaser. You can stretch the concept of authority, but, unless you 
are peculiarly free from the tyranny of words, you cannot stretch 
it very far. We also labor under this difficulty, that the concept of 
apparent authority has not been developed as a specific instrument 
for dealing with the case of the purchaser who gives value for 
goods in the possession of the alleged agent, but has been given 
broader shape and is applicable to any type of transaction. This in-
cludes cases which are relatively weak in point of justice and 
policy, such as the case where the third person deals with the agent 
as agent, and does no more. in reliance upon his supposed authority 
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than to make a bilateral contract, whereas the purchaser with 
whom we are concerned more often deals with the bailee as owner, 
and, before he learns of the true situation, has suffered a much 
more. drastic change of position. Naturally, the weaker equities of 
some of these other cases have tended to hold the doctrine of 
apparent authority within narrow bounds. Can we do justice in 
cases of purchase from bailee, unless we center our attention upon 
the peculiar conditions of these cases, and develop specific doc-
trine for their solution? 
It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the purchaser's 
difficulties turn entirely upon the ineptitude of the doctrine of 
apparent authority, for he ordinarily fares no better when he 
turns to the large and elastic doctrine of estoppel. In that case, too, 
thinking is brought to focus on the owner's behavior, rather than 
the purchaser's change of position in reliance on appearances. It 
is said that the owner is not estopped merely because his conduct 
has in fact misled the purchaser: he must have violated a duty 
to the purchaser, or be guilty of bad faith or negligence, or (and 
here is, perhaps, the inarticulate major premise, the policy fac-
tor, which actuates the decisions) his conduct must be culpable in 
that it created an unusually deceptive appearance and lacked the 
justification which is furnished by common practice.39 Obviously 
estoppel, so defined, will not reach the case where, (1) the only 
misleading appearance is that created by the seller's possession 
(which may mean ownership or bailment or theft, as every 
mother's son should know), and (2) the owner permitted the 
seller to have the possession as an incident of that familiar and 
wholly legitimate type of transaction known as bailment. As the 
law stands, the purchaser cannot do better than to argue apparent 
authority, combing the case for shreds of evidence which might 
suggest authority in fact, wherewith he may turn to his advantage 
the ambiguity of the term "apparent authority.''40 Of course the 
purchaser may well throw in, with a prayer, the "one of two 
innocent persons" formula. 
39 See W1LL1sroN, SALES §312. 
40 The point is that evidence from which the jury might find actual authority takes 
the case to the jury, and the court's instructions concerning the significance of this 
evidence, with exigesis of the phrase "apparent authority," is not likely to register very 
effectively. The difficulty of doctrinal statement of the law of apparent authority will 
become evident upon perusal of MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., §720 et seq. (1903). 
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Such being the intellectual tools which the judges have used, 
it is not surprising that they have distinguished between one bail-
ment and another, the distinctions turning on the actual authority 
conferred on the bailee though actual authority is not made the 
sole criterion of decision. For example, a sale by a bailee who has 
authority to sell but exceeds the limitations on his authority, is 
distinguished from a pledge by a bailee who has plenary authority 
to sell but no authority to pledge. In the one case, the principal 
is attempting to divide the juristic atom, authority to sell, and his 
instructions are spoken of as "secret" limitations on the agent's 
authority, but, in the other case, the principal merely asks us 
to distinguish two very different atoms, authority to sell and au-
thority to pledge, and the limitation is not called "secret." The 
word "secret" connotes deception, but, in point of ~eception, is 
there any difference, even of degree, between these cases? Naturally, 
either sale or pledge by a bailee for safekeeping, or for use, 
is quite beyond the pale, unless the bailee has been given unusual 
indicia of ownership. In our disposition of these problems, no 
sharp distinction has been drawn between purchase from an es-
tablished merchant or broker and purchase from a vagabond. 
There is, of course, a difference, but it merely goes to color the 
authority of the seller, his authority implied or apparent. It leaves 
us miles from Lord Ellenborough and market overt.41-
What is the law in action in these cases of common law trust? 
That is a mystery to the editor. The rules of law throw up difficult 
fact questions. The normal remedies are legal, as distinguished 
from equitable, and that brings in the jury. Perhaps the typical 
case will make the purchaser's primary problem one of getting 
to the jury, with tactical resemblance to the typical negligence 
action. Then one must remember the fugitive nature of chattels, 
which may dispose of all questions of legal rights, and the triv-
iality of many chattel cases, which may make the prosecution of 
actions unprofitable. Is the net conclusion that possession is at least 
nine points of the law? 
5. Factors' Acts. In a few states we have factors' acts, which 
carry us a step from the common law. The following are the im-
41 For further particulars, see WILLISTON, SALES §313 et seq.; MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d 
ed., §§704-1078 (1903); Waite, "Caveat Emptor and the Judicial Process," 25 CoL. L. REv. 
129 (1925). 
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portant clauses of the New York statute,42 which is fairly typical 
of this somewhat varied legislation. 
"1. Every factor or other agent, entrusted with the posses-
sion of any bill of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouse-
man's receipt for the delivery of any merchandise, and every 
sµch factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of 
title, who shall be intrusted with the possession of any mer-
chandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security for any ad-
vances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be 
the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any con-
trac~ made by such agent with any other person, for the sale 
or disposition of the whole or any part of such merchandise 
and any account receivable or other chose in action created by 
sale or other disposition of such merchandise, for any money 
advanced, or negotiable instrument or other obligation in 
writing given by such other person upon the faith thereof. 
"2. Every person who shall hereafter accept or take any such 
merchandise and any account receivable or other chose in 
action created by sale or other disposition of such merchandise 
in deposit from any such agent, as a security for any anteced-
ent debt or demand, shall not acquire thereby, or enforce any 
right or interest in or to such merchandise and any account 
receivable or other chose in action created by sale or other 
disposition of such merchandise or document, other than was 
possessed or might have been enforced by such agent at the 
time of such deposit. 
"4. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize a com-
mon carrier, warehouseman, or other person to whom mer-
chandise or other property may be committed for transpor-
tation or storage only, to sell or hypothecate the same." 
Aside from the reference to documents of title, does this 
statute draw any distinctions between the several types of entrust-
ing? Does it distinguish between dealers and others? Does it dis-
tinguish between purchase in the ordinary sense and purchase by 
way of security? How much common law do you suppose would 
be read into the statute? If pledgees and mortgagees are protected, 
may it not be that the most important function of the statute is 
precisely the protection of this class of purchasers?43 
42 [40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §43.] 
43 For .further light on factors' acts, see WILLISTON, SALES §320 et seq. 
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C. Vendor Holds Documents of Title. The common law, work-
ing with its theories of estoppel and apparent authority, has given 
some weight to indicia of ownership other than possession. For 
example, in Pickering v. Busk44 it was thought significant that the 
owner had placed the goods in warehouse in the name of the agent. 
That meant more to the court than mere possession of the goods. 
We cannot attempt even to catalog the sundry circumstances 
which have had like effect in the decisions, but we must examine 
that commonest type of case, where the vendor holds a bill of 
lading or a warehouse receipt. Here the prime question is whether, 
and how far, the law adopts the views of merchants and bankers, 
who not only treat the document as representative of the goods so 
that, for example, transfer of the document is considered as a 
delivery of the goods, but also assume that the ·document means. 
what it says with respect to the ultimate right to get the goods, 
reading the words "bearer" and "order" in the sense made famil-
iar by bills of exchange and promissory notes. Dealing with bona 
fide purchase of such documents, judicial opinions have been so 
divergent as to constitute two distinct schools of thought, which 
are referred to as the common law theory and the mercantile 
theory. The former tends to assimilate transfer of the document 
of title to delivery of the goods themselves. The latter tends to 
assimilate transfer of such documents to negotiation of bills of 
exchange. Each proposition must be put in this guarded form, 
for exact equation is not reached on either side. Neither should. 
it be supposed that the two views give divergent results in all cases. 
Even on the common law theory, a purchaser from one to whom 
the owner entrusted a document of title would probably prevail,. 
estoppel being predicated on the owner's conduct as something 
more misleading than delivery of possession of goods. On the other 
hand, if the document was lost by, or stolen from the owner, or if 
the goods were lost or stolen, and the thief or finder bailed them 
and procured a document of title, it is by no means clear that a 
purchaser of that document would be protected under the mer-
cantile theory.45 All that can be said, in broad generalization, is. 
44 15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 758 (1812). 
45 The distinction between the owner who has entrusted his goods to the vendor, 
and the owner who has suffered theft or loss, is conspicuous in the cases which involve 
documents of title, though almost wholly ignored in other cases. 
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that we have two schools of thought, and their two lines of think-
ing are significant for some case_s. 
_ __ In recent years, we have had much legislation touching docu-
ments of title, but it requires careful reading. Not all of the stat-
utes are as forthright as the following provision of the Uniform 
Bills of Lading Act- [§31]: · 
"A negotiable bill may be negotiated by any person in 
possession of the same, however such possession may have 
- heen acquired if, by the terms of the bill, the carrier under-
- takes to deliver the goods to the order of such person, or if at 
the time of negotiation the bill is in such form that it may 
_ be negotiated by delivery." 
· Reference should also be made to the Federal Bills of Lading 
Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Sales 
Act, and miscellaneous local statutes. Some of these (including 
some of the· Uniform acts) go no further than to protect the pur-
chaser where there has been some element of trusting by the 
owner, but even then are important, more or less so according to 
the antecedent state of the local law. Whatever the state of the 
legislation, one can safely make the vague assertion that quasi-
negotiability is conferred upon documents of title.46 Although the 
law regarding 'documents of title is but a small corner in the legal 
picture of bona fide purchase, its practical significance is very 
great because almost all large scale goods business and some small 
scale business use the mechanism of bills of lading and warehouse 
receipts. Does this mean that big business is better protected than 
small business, and that, as usual, the ultimate consumer is way 
out at the dirty end o_f the stick? Before one climbs onto that soap 
box, he should note the practical factors protecting the purchaser 
of shoe strings. But how - about the retail purchaser of an 
automobile? 
D. Vendor Retaining Possession After f'revious Sale. The case 
is this:-V sells chattels to P(l) and the parties intend immediate 
transfer of ownership which, as matter of law, effects immediate 
transfer of ownership, hut V retains possession and later sells the 
same chattels to P(2), a bona fide purchaser. In the separation of 
possession from general ownership, and sale by the possessor, you 
see at once a resemblance to the case of sale by a bailee. Or would 
46 For general discussion, see WILLISTON, SALES §§405--444. 
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you say that this is a case of sale by a bailee? That would be entirely 
logical, but the vendor retaining possession is not ordinarily 
called a bailee, at least when the question raised is that of the title 
acquired by a second purchaser. And it would be confusing rather 
than helpful to call it bailment, because the law applicable to this 
case is quite different from that which applies to the typical 
bailment case.47 
Legal relatives of the case now in hand are found in quite an-
other quarter, viz. in fraud on creditors. There are many kinds of 
fraud on creditors which have but a remote relationship to our 
bona fide purchase case, but there is one which is own brother to 
it. In our initial hypothetical, above, substitute advance of credit 
by C to V, in place of the sale by V to P(2), and there it is. 
In both the creditor and the purchaser cases, one finds two dis-
tinguishable lines of thought. One heads up in the telling phrases 
"ostensible ownership" and "reputed ownership." It is essentially 
an estoppel idea. P(l) is responsible for the deceptive appearance 
of ownership in Vandis _estopped in favor of V's creditor or sub-
sequent purchaser who has changed his position in reliance on 
that appearance. Estoppel by assisted misrepresentation, Ewart 
would say. But is the appearance any more deceptive than in the 
case of any bailment? Perhaps in some degree. One who knew that 
V was owner, when he was in fact owner, might readily assume 
continued ownership as long as V had possession, though he would 
not assume acquisition of ownership of all goods which had come 
into V's possession. Perhaps so. But there is at least as much room 
for differentiation at the other end. Bailment for safekeeping, for 
service, for use, or for sale, is probably a more common, a more 
normal business transaction than retention of possession by a ven-
dor. The law must make place for normal business arrangements, 
hut need not so favor freak transactions. If that is not enough to 
reconcile the application of the estoppel to vendor's retention of 
possession-with refusal to apply it to ordinary hailments, you may 
write this down as another of the numerous historical accidents 
which enliven the law of priorities. 
47 If V delivered possession to P(l), who immediately redelivered it to V, that would 
be called retention of possession, and treated accordingly. On the other hand, if a suffi-
cient interval (say a year) elapsed between delivery to P(l) and his redelivery, that would 
be cal1ed bailment and treated differently. This is not the place to try to fix the line 
between the two kinds of cases. 
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But are the creditor and purchaser cases quite alike, from the 
estoppel point of view? P(2) relied on immediate acquisition of 
ownership from V at the very moment that he parted with value. 
But the creditor, even the creditor who extended credit to V in 
the interval after his sale to P(l) and before delivery of possession, 
could not, if he knew his way around, rely on this property in the 
same sense. He ought to have known that even if V actually owned 
the property then, he might not own it by the time he, the creditor, 
had occasion to levy on it. Granted that a man's present assets 
mean something to those who are asked to give him credit, and 
even to those who have already given him credit, they mean much 
more to one who is purchasing those assets. That is why the care-
ful lender regards a present mortgage or pledge as better than an 
unsecured debt. This being so, the close assimilation of creditor 
and purchaser cases is rather surprising. P.erhaps it would not 
have occurred if estoppel had been the sole line of thinking on 
these problems, but there is another approach on which the two 
cases are identical. 
The other line of thought heads up in another telling phrase, 
"badge of fraud." The idea is that retention of possession by an 
alleged vendor founds an inference, or at least a suspicion, that the 
alleged sale was not a sale at all, but a sham. This, you will see, 
makes of the case not the thing we started with in our initial 
hypothetical, viz. sale by V to P(l) with retention of possession by 
V, but rather its opposite, pretended sale by V to P(l) with reten-
tion of ownership by V. So long as you think of these things in the 
manner of the hypothetical case, where facts are facts, you will 
have difficulty in getting the relation of the two lines of thought 
we are examining. You must think of the case as it comes up in 
court, where facts are alleged and evidenced but never proved in 
the fullest sense. In that situation, it is possible to say to P(l) 
either of these two things, (1) granting that there was a sale, you 
are estopped from setting it up, or (2) we don't believe there was 
any sale. Indeed, it would not be absurd to say both of these things. 
The two ideas are not repugnant to each other: they drive in the 
same general direction. 
Yet the two ideas are not equivalent. If the estoppel idea is 
applied, does it not lead to the conclusion that the prior purchaser 
is absolutely precluded from setting up his purchase as against 
creditor or later purchaser? On the other hand, if we use the 
"badge of fraud" idea, is it not an open question whether we 
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should regard the badge as conclusively establishing fraud, or only 
creating a prima fade presumption of fraud, or merely as evidence 
of fraud? In fact each of these views concerning the effect of the 
badge has been asserted by the courts. Of course their results are 
not necessarily different. That depends on the circumstances of 
the case. 
With these two principal lines of thought, roughly similar but 
not interchangeable, and with divergence of opinion concerning 
the effect of the fraud theory, confusion of authority is naturally 
extreme. Further complication results from legislation, which is 
various.48 
Before we leave retention of possession, we should note that 
land stands on an entirely different footing from chattels. This 
may be attributed in part to the fact that the fraud statutes have 
often discriminated between the two, but it would seem to be 
chiefly due to market practice, modes of transfer, etc. There are 
early cases, both English and American, which make out fraud in 
the retention of possession by a vendor of land, and there are some 
statutes which lump land and chattels. Nevertheless, it is doubtful 
whether retention of possession of land is really significant any-
where, except that it makes possible bona fide purchase under the 
equity rule or the recording acts, which could not be if possession 
had been delivered to the first purchaser. Is it necessary to say 
that in other cases than retention of possession by a vendor, mere 
possession of land, as by a tenant for life, for years or at will, or 
by a disseisor, is not a basis of bona fide purchase? Even in the days 
when seisin was practically synonymous with property, that was so. 
RECORDING ACTS: LAND 
We now turn to examine the recording system, first for land. 
It is obviously dangerous to discuss at large forty-eight statutes, no 
two of which are exactly alike, but behind endless variations in 
detail one can see a common structure in the recording acts, and 
something coming out of them which may be called the recording 
system. We should begin by sampling the statutes or, to speak 
more exactly, sampling the vital provisions of the statutes, for the 
bulk of every recording act is devoted to the organization of the 
48 See 2 MECHEM, SALES §979 et seq. (1901). 
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recorder's office, and such like business. It may, however, be well 
to issue a warning that in many states there has been in the course 
of time amendment of the vitals of the statute, and the amend-
ments have not always been incorporated into the amended sec-
tions nor thereto cited in the compilations. For example, Mich. 
Comp. Laws (1929), §13309 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 
§565.35], defining the conveyances which must be recorded, still 
carries the old provision excluding land contracts, and there is no 
reference to the act of 1879 (C. L. §13353, et seq.) [Mich. Comp. 
Laws (1948) §565.354] which, by a generous interpretation, re-
peals the older provision. The moral is that you should not 
reach hasty conclusions as to what are the vital provisions of a 
particular statute. 
Consolidated Laws of New York (McKinney), Chap. 52 
(Real Property Law), Art. 9, §290 [50 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1945) art. 9, §290]: 1. The term "real property," 
as used in this article, includes lands, tenements and heredita-
ments and chattels real, except a lease for a term not exceed-
ing three years. 
2. The term "purchaser" includes every person to whom 
any estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a valua-
ble consideration, and every assignee of a mortgage, lease or 
other conditional estate. 
3. The term "conveyance" includes every written instru-
ment, by which any estate or interest in real property is cre-
ated, transferred, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the title 
to any real property may be affected, including an instru-
ment in execution of a power, although the power be one of 
revocation only, and an instrument postponing or subordinat-
ing a mortgage lien; except a will, a lease for a term not ex-
ceeding three years, an ex_ecutory contract for the sale or pur-
chase of lands, and an instrument containing a power to con-
vey real property as the agent or attorney for the owner of 
such property. 
§291. A conveyance of real property, within the state, on 
being duly acknowledged by the person executing the same, 
or proved as required by this chapter, and such acknowledg-
ment or proof duly certified when required by this chapter, 
may be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county where 
such real property is situated, and such county clerk shall, 
upon the request of any party, on tender of the lawful fees 
therefor, record the same in his said office. Every such con-
veyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent pur-
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chaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, from 
the same vendor, his heirs or devisees, of the same real 
property or any portion thereof, whose conveyance is first 
duly recorded. . 
* * * 
§315. Different sets of books must be provided by the 
recording officer of each county, for the recording of deeds 
and mortgages; in one of which sets he must record all con-
veyances and other instruments absolute in their terms de-
livered to him, pursuant to law, to be so recorded, which are 
not intended as mortgages, or securities in the nature of mort-
gages, and in the other set, such mortgages and securities 
delivered to him. 
§316. Each recording officer must provide, at the expense 
of his county, proper books for making general indexes of 
instruments recorded in his office, and must form indexes 
therein, so as to afford correct and easy reference to the books 
of record in his office. There must be one set of indexes for 
mortgages or securities in the nature of mortgages, and an-
other set for conveyances and other instruments not intended 
as such mortgages or securities. Each set must contain two 
lists in alphabetical order, one consisting of the names of the 
grantors or mortgagors, followed by the names of their gran-
tees or mortgagees, and the other list consisting of the names 
of the grantees or mortgagees, followed by the names of their 
grantors or mortgagors, with proper blanks in each class of 
names, for subsequent entries, which entries must be made 
as instruments are delivered for record. . . . 
§317. Order of recording. Every instrument, entitled to 
be recorded, must be recorded by the recording officer in the 
order and as of the time of its delivery to him therefor, and 
is considered recorded from the time of such delivery. 
* * * 
§324. Effect of recording assignment of mortgage. The 
recording of an assignment of a mortgage is not in itself a 
notice of such assignment to a mortgagor, his heirs or per-
sonal representatives, so as to invalidate a payment made by 
either of them to the mortgagee. 
Revised Statutes of Illinois (Cahill, 1933), Chap. 30, §29 
[Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 30, §27]. Deeds, mortgages, powers 
of attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the 
title to real estate in this state, shall be recorded in the county 
in which such real estate is situated; but if such county is 
not organized, then in the county to which such unorganized 
county is attached for judicial purposes. 
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§31 [§29]. All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of 
writing which are authorized to be recorded, shall take effect 
and be in force from and after the time of filing the same for 
record, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent 
purchasers, without notice; and all such deeds and title papers 
shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent 
purchasers, without notice, until the same shall be filed for 
record. 
§32 [§30]. Deeds, mortgages and other instruments of 
writing relating to real estate shall be deemed, from the time 
of being filed for record, notice to subsequent purchasers and 
creditors, though not acknowledged or proven according to 
law; but the same shall not be read as evidence, unless their 
execution be proved in the manner required by the rules 
of evidence applicable to such writings, so as to supply the 
defects of such acknowledgment or proof. 
General Laws of Massachusetts (1932), Chap. 183, §4 
[amended, Laws 1941, p. 85, Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 183, 
§4]. A conveyance of an estate in fee simple, fee tail or for life, 
or a lease for more than seven years from the making thereof, 
shall not be valid as against any person, except the grantor or 
lessor, his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice 
of it, unless it, or an office copy as provided in section thirteen 
of chapter thirty-six, is recorded in the registry of deeds for 
the county or district in which the land to which it relates 
lies. 
General Code of Ohio (1926) §8542 [amended, Ohio 
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5301.23]. All mortgages, exe-
cuted agreeably to the provisions of this chapter, shall be re-
corded in the office of the recorder of the county in which 
the mortgaged premises are situated, and take effect from 
the time they are delivered to the recorder of the proper 
county for record. If two or more mortgages are presented 
for record on the same day, they shall take effect from the 
order of presentation for record. The first presented must be 
the first recorded, and the first recorded shall have preference. 
§8543 [amended, Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) 
§5301.25]. All other deeds and instruments of writing for the 
conveyance or incumbrance of lands, tenements, or heredita-
ments, executed agreeably to the provisions of this chapter, 
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county 
in which the premises are situated, and until so recorded or 
filed for record, they shall be deemed fraudulent, so far as 
relates to a subsequent bona fide purchaser having, at the 
time of purchase, no knowledge of the existence of such 
former deed or instrument. 
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It will be observed that each of these statutes has these fea-
tures: (1) it authorizes, by implication at least, the recording of 
certain instruments affecting title to land, and (2) it declares that 
such instruments not so recorded shall be inoperative, at least 
as against certain (or do you think it uncertain?) persons. (3) The 
Illinois statute also declares that the record of such instruments 
shall be notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors, the New 
York statute assumes a general rule of notice and states an ex-
ception, while the others are silent on this point. 
Notice by Record. Let us first get out of the way the rela-
tively unimportant subject of notice by record. It is perfectly 
settled that the record imparts notice, even though the statute is 
wholly silent on the point. This may be viewed as a special ap-
plication of a general rule concerning notice of public records. 
Our simple statement assumes that the instrument is one the 
record of which is authorized by the statute-otherwise it seems to 
be settled that the record does not impart notice-and it also 
assumes that the record is properly made-erroneous records 
raise a difficult question. But the chief problem is to determine to 
whom and under what circumstances record is notice. Suppose an 
application for fire insurance contained fraudulent statements 
regarding the applicant's title to the premises: could the defense 
of fraud be answered by record notice to the insurer of the actual 
state of the title, even if the statute said (as several do say) that 
record is "notice to all persons"? Suppose the fraudulent state-
ments were made to a purchaser of the land: could the vendor 
escape the consequences on the ground that the victim was 
charged with notice of the defect of title, even if the statute said 
"notice to purchasers"? Suppose a credit statement contains claims 
of ownership of land which the debtor does not own at all, 
and the statute says "notice to creditors"? Whether the statute' 
says this or that or nothing at all about notice, is it not necessary 
for the court to work out a doctrine of notice based on policy 
and justice? If it does, where will it come out? We shall not 
attempt to fight out this problem because, as previously observed, 
notice is a relatively unimportant phase of the recording system. 
There is a tendency among students, and one even sees it in 
judicial opinions, to make record notice the central point of the 
recording system. It is submitted, however, that this is seriously 
misleading. Take the simple case where grantee A records his 
deed and the grantor subsequently sells to B: it can be said that A 
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prevails because B has notice of A's deed, but is it not at least as 
sound to say that A prevails because his deed was prior in time 
and there is nothing in the case to take it out of the primary rule 
of priority? Suppose that A had not rec?rded and B purchased in 
good faith: if it is argued that B prevails because he has no notice 
.of A's deed, the argument is incomplete since it is clear that pur-
chasers without notice do not necessarily get good title, and leav-
ing the case on that basis tends to confuse all one's notions about 
priorities. Is it not better to say that B prevails because the statute 
says that the unrecorded deed is void as against the good faith 
purchaser? Notice from the record is important in some cases 
( e.g. where it precludes bona fide purchase under the old equity 
rule) but it should not be thought of as a primary feature of the 
recording system.49 Of course we should not make a fetish of 
this point. When it is convenient to argue a case in terms of record 
notice we will do so, even though that is not the soundest analysis 
of the case. But we must not let that distort our thinking. 
We can easily define the cases in which record notice is really 
a critical factor. They are the cases where (I) the recording act has 
no application except for its notice function, and (2) some other 
rule of law makes notice relevant. For example: V conveys land 
to P(l) without receiving full payment and the local law, we 
will assume, creates an equitable grantor's lien for the unpaid 
price. Then P(I) sells and conveys to P(2), a bona fide purchaser. 
It is difficult to say that the recording act avoids V's lien, because 
there is no "conveyance" (New York statute) or "deed, mortgage 
or other instrument of writing" (Illinois statute) which has not 
been recorded. But, V's lien being merely equitable, P(2) is 
protected by the equity rule of bona fide purchase unless he 
has notice of the lien. Notice, then, is the crux of the case, and if 
V put into his deed to P(l) a recital that the purchase price had 
not been paid, or if he can get onto the record ( effectively, by 
a legally recordable instrument) an acknowledgment to the same 
effect by P(l), he is secure. 
Recordable Instruments: Undocumented Interests. The points 
in the recording acts which demand serious attention are those 
on which every statute is fairly explicit, viz. the instruments 
49 See Aigler, "Operation of the Recording Acts," 22 MrcH. L. REV. 405 (1924). 
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that are recordable and the effect of failure to record them. On 
the first point, the statute may contain a rather elaborate enum-
eration of conveyances or it may be very concise. In either case, 
the terms used may be such as to clearly embrace all instruments 
affecting title to land, or they may be such as to make that 
doubtful, to say the least. 
Can you find in any of our sample statutes anything except 
a provision for recording certain written instruments affecting 
title? Then, when you tum to the second point, can you find 
anything except a declaration that recordable instruments are 
void, as against certain persons, if not recorded? The question 
becomes material in the case of the purchaser who finds that 
there is an outstanding claim which was not created by or derived 
through a recordable instrument, but "by operation of law." We 
have already put one such case, that of the implied grantor's lien. 
There are many others: e.g. the claim of an heir of a former 
owner, purchaser's title derived from persons supposed to be the 
sole heirs; e.g. widow claiming dower, purchaser's title derived 
from husband during coverture, or from heirs and/or admin-
istrator after husband's death; e.g. title acquired by adverse pos-
session or easement acquired by prescription. In the cases last 
mentioned, there will usually be such possession or physical 
enjoyment as to convey notice and preclude bona fide purchase, 
but the case is not unknown where the adverse possessor abandons 
possession after acquiring title, and some recording acts make 
notice by possession immaterial. 
Note that, in the cases put in the last paragraph, the purchaser 
can not fall back on the equitable doctrine of b.f.p. because our 
law has not worked out the rights of the primary parties (vendor 
and true owner) in terms of legal and equitable interests. It is 
otherwise with such undocumented interests as that of the de-
frauded vendor or the unpaid vendor who has an impli~d lien. 
That will help out purchasers but not creditors: as to the latter, 
the question of the recording act is critical. 
Do you think a court might work out an estoppel to assert an 
undocumented claim because the purchaser was misled by the 
record? On this point might we distinguish, for example, the 
case of constructive trust based on fraud, from, for example, the 
case of implied grantor's lien for purchase money? 
Would you expect any court, by liberal interpretation or 
by estoppel, to make the recording act operate as if it read, "a 
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bona fide purchaser shall get the title which, on the record, his 
vendor appears to have"?50 
Persons Against Whom the Unrecorded Instrument Is Void. 
Given an instrument which is recordable, but not recorded, under 
what conditions and in favor of what persons is it avoided? Except 
for the mortgage section of the Ohio statute, which is a very rare 
bird, you will see that all of our samples attempt some kind of 
specification of the persons who can avoid the unrecorded instru-
ment. In doing this, they exhibit two methods. They may describe 
the classes of persons for whose benefit (against whom) the un-
recorded instrument is avoided, or they may declare the unre-
corded instrument void as against all persons except those of 
described classes. The two types are about equally common. 
A. Under Statutes Which Describe These Persons: (1) Pur-
chasers. Statutes of this type always name "purchasers." They 
may add qualifying clauses, "in good faith," "without notice," or 
"without actual notice." The more general terms are, of course, 
interpreted in the light of the equity rule of bona fide purchase. 
The terms "actual notice" may be interpreted strictly, or much 
of the traditional learning about constructive notice may be read 
into them-after all, where is the line between actual knowledge, 
on the one hand, and actual suspicion and knowledge which 
almost inevitably creates suspicion, on the other hand?51 Again, the 
term "purchaser" may or may not be qualified by "for value," 
or the like. With or without such dressing, the requirement of 
value is asserted by the courts, and the old case law as to what 
constitutes value is read into the statute, so that mere promise 
is not enough and security or payment of an antecedent debt is 
a ticket to a fight. You will, however, find that the judgment 
creditor purchasing at his own execution sale is almost always 
protected. 
Some of the statutes express a further requirement, purchase 
"from the same vendor," "from the same vendor, his heirs or 
devisees," or "from the same vendor, his heirs, devisees or assigns." 
50 Material on some of the foregoing questions may 1be found in Durfee and Flem-
ing, "Res Judicata and Recording Acts," 28 MICH. L. REv. 811 at 836 et seq. (1930), where 
it is used analogically for the solution of cases not involving good faith purchase but 
good faith suit. 
51See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §§568, 569, 573 (1920). Even actual notice 
seems to be immaterial in North Carolina. See N.C. Code (1931) §§3309, 3311, and cases 
there cited. 
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Does it make any difference which of these phrases is used, or 
whether any of them is used? Would any court, under any statute, 
protect a purchaser whose chain of title did not lead back to the 
transferor in the unrecorded conveyance? or refuse to protect a 
purchaser whose chain of title did so, e.g. a purchaser from 
grantee or heir of the party who executed the unrecorded con-
veyance?52 The New York statute (widely copied-the formula 
first appeared in the Rev. Stat. of 1828) adds to the other quali-
fications of the purchaser the clause "whose conveyance is first 
duly recorded." The obvious idea was to put a premium on 
prompt recording. But is it fair, e.g. in a case where the first 
grantee, after delaying record for weeks or months, gets his con-
veyance on record one day after bona fide purchase has intervened 
and one day before the later comer records? Even with this type 
of statute, is the recording system adequately stated in the formula 
that the party who first records has priority? 
In the points heretofore reviewed, it is obvious that the record-
ing acts are closely related to the chancery rule of bona fide 
purchase. One suspects that the whole scheme was inspired by 
the equity rule, and it is certain that the equity cases have been 
used in the interpretation of the statutes. There are, however, 
some striking points of difference between the two bodies of law. 
The equity rule makes much of the distinction between legal titles 
and equities or equitable estates. None of the recording acts 
have in terms drawn that distinction, and there are only a few 
decisions which have imported it from the older learning. And 
this goes for both ends of the statute. A prior legal interest created 
by a recordable instrument is as readily avoided as a prior equi-
table interest similarly created, and a subsequent purchaser of 
an equitable interest is as fully protected as a subsequent pur-
chaser of legal title, subject to the qualification that if he does not 
get a recordable instrument he is in difficulty under that type of 
statute which carries the clause, "whose conveyance is first duly 
recorded." Furthermore, the recording acts do not, in terms, 
deal with anything but record and nonrecord of instruments 
affecting title, and it is not easy (putting it mildly) to get beyond 
the terms of the statutes. On the other hand, the equity rule has 
52 See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §567 (1920); WEBB, RECORD OF TITLE §214 
(1890). 
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no such feature. The "implied" equities, such as constructive 
trust and equitable lien, are cut down at least as readily as an 
express trust created by deed. Would it not seem that the differ-
ences between the two bodies of law are quite as significant as their 
resemblances? 
What is the relation between the recording acts and the doc-
trine of estoppel? The definition of estoppel requires change 
of position in reliance upon appearances created or permitted by 
the party to be estopped, and the factor of reliance is often sharply 
insisted on (so that, for example, action in ignorance of the mis-
leading conduct of the estoppee is not enough) though in certain 
types of case the requirement is relaxed.53 But there are several 
square decisions that an unrecorded conveyance is void as against 
a subsequent purchaser without notice whether he examined the 
record and was misled, or did not examine the record.54 The 
writer knows no decision to the contrary. Is this to be regarded as 
a merely mechanical application of the letter of the statute, or is 
it justified by administrative convenience? Although reliance is 
unnecessary in a case which comes within the terms of the statute, 
reliance on the records may help a purchaser who can not make 
a case within those terms. In lviarling v. Nommensen,55 the sub-
sequent purchaser could not satisfy the statutory requirements 
because he had not "first duly recorded his conveyance," but he 
proved that he had, before his purchase, examined the record. 
It was held that the prior grantee was estopped. The decision is 
extraordinary in that the estoppel was based on the provisions 
of the statute although the statute did not in itself apply to the 
case. But does it not fit in nicely with those cases which have 
declined to read all of the old law of bona fide purchase into 
the statutes, e.g. as to purchase at execution sale? All can be said 
to embody generous development of the policy of the legislation, 
instead of mechanical application of its terms. 
(2) Creditors. Even those creditors who have fixed a lien on 
the land by attachment, judgment or execution, are not pur-
chasers, either under the equity rule or under the statutes. Some-
63 EWART, EsrOPPEL 132, 140 et seq. (1900). 
54 James v. Newman, 147 Iowa 574, 126 N.W. 781 (1910); Watts v. Lundeen, 165 Minn. 
300, 206 N.W. 444 (1925); Ebling Brewing Co. v. Gennaro, 189 App. Div. 782, 179 N.Y.S. 
384 (1919). 
55 127 Wis. 363, 106 N.W. 844 (1906). 
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times a creditor has been protected by the use of an estoppel 
theory in conjunction with a "purchaser" recording act, in the 
manner of Marling v. Nommensen.56 More important, many 
recording acts name as their beneficiaries not only purchasers but 
also creditors. Creditors may be named simpliciter, or with quali-
fications, as "existing creditors," "subsequent creditors," "judg-
ment creditors," etc. But, whatever its terms, this branch of the 
statute requires interpretation. 
In the cases, one finds two principal lines of thought: (I) The 
creditors who should be protected are those who, if not actually 
misled by an examination of the record, were at least in a position 
where they might have been misled if they had examined the 
record. Within this description are, obviously, those who gave 
credit to the record owner after the execution of the instrument 
and before its record; less obviously, those who gave credit before 
the execution of the instrument and might have indulged the 
debtor in reliance upon his apparent continued ownership. (2) 
The second idea is that the creditors who should be protected 
are those who, like purchasers, acquired an interest in the land 
after the execution of the instrument and before its record, which 
means those who, in this fatal interval, obtained liens by attach-
ment, judgment, execution or creditor's bill. Under either of 
these views, a creditor must obtain a judgment before he is in a 
position to launch an attack upon the unrecorded conveyance, 
but that procedural requirement is an entirely different thing. 
The first of these two ideas is readily seen to involve interpre-
tation of the statute in the light of the principle of estoppel. One 
can see something of the elements of estoppel in levy of process 
or prosecution of creditor's bill (involving outlay of effort and 
money) in the interval while the instrument is unrecorded, but 
it is, to say the least, no stronger than the estoppel element in 
the other cases. Therefore, the second idea (viz. that it is only 
those acquiring liens in the fatal interval who are to be protected) 
can not be reconciled with estoppel principles. 57 It is, however, 
the prevailing rule that only those who acquire liens in the fatal 
56 Ibid. And see 28 YALE L. J. 685 (1919). 
57Note that a subsequent creditor, meaning one who gives credit in the interval of 
non record, can not satisfy this rule unless he moves very fast or the interval is very long. 
Prior creditors are much more likely to make the grade. Yet subsequent creditors have 
the stronger case, from the point of view of prejudicial change of position. 
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interval are protected. If the statute does not explicitly dictate 
this rule, and few of the statutes do so, whence does it come? It 
seems to be the product of a conveyancing approach to the statute. 
The idea must be that the whole statute deals with priority of title 
to land; or, more precisely, ·the statute creates an exception to 
the primary canon of priority, by virtue of which a later transferee 
shall, under the stated conditions, prevail. Thus creditors are 
equated to purchasers, and neither can take advantage of non-
record unless he acquired an interest in the land during the inter-
val of nonrecord. The major premise of this argument is sound; 
without doubt, the business of the statutes is priorities. But where 
do we go from here? Problems in priority have not always been 
dealt with in this manner. As we have seen, some courts have 
protected the purchaser who parted with his money in good 
faith, though he received notice before he got his conveyance. 
Again, and nearer to the point, creditors .have sometimes achieved 
priority because of ostensible ownership (e.g. retention of posses-
sion by seller of goods) existing at the time they gave credit, though 
removed before they levied. 58 Are we not facing a question which 
is basic to bona fide purchase and all its relatives, the question 
whether we will shape the rules in the image of estoppel and 
make them turn on change of position in reliance on appearances, 
or allow them to crystallize in forms which bear no more than a 
family resemblance to·estoppel? Surely the former is the preferable 
course, in the absence of particular conditions which give a 
countervailing advantage to a rule· of thumb. Is there any such 
counter factor in the case . in hand? 
Thinking this through, you will see that a serious problem 
arises· if we make the unrecorded conveyance void as against prior 
creditors (meaning those who gave credit before the conveyance 
was executed) even though they do not levy within the period 
between execution and recording of the conveyance. Every trans-
feror owes some debts, we may suppose, and all his existing credi-
tors will, under the rule we are considering, instantly acquire in-
cipient priority over the transferee, no matter how brief the inter-
val between execution and record of the transfer. At their leisure, 
then, they can levy on the property and enjoy priority over the 
transferee. If we let in prior creditors at all (and the same thing 
58 See 2 MECHEM, SALES §963 (1901). 
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goes for subsequent creditors, though with less weight), should we 
not introduce a time-factor-restrict avoidance to the case where 
a conveyance is withheld from the record for a stated period, or for 
an unreasonable period? But that would not be a politic rule 
with respect to subsequent purchasers. Some of the early record-
ing acts did have this feature in their purchaser provisions, but 
we soon came to see that, as between the prior transferee and 
the subsequent bona fide purchaser, it was better to say that no 
matter how fast the former stepped, the latter would prevail if 
he purchased in the interval of nonrecord. It comes, then, to this: 
if we are going to protect both purchasers and creditors by the 
recording acts, we need distinctly different provisions for the 
two cases. But legislatures have usually indulged their vicious taste 
for short and pithy statutes, giving us one curt provision for both 
purchasers and creditors. That fairly forces the courts to read down 
the creditor clause to something less than its face value. Perhaps 
this is the explanation of the not altogether satisfactory decisions 
which deny the protection of the statutes to creditors who have 
not levied in the interval of nonrecord. 
B. Under Statutes Which Describe the Persons Against Whom 
the Unrecorded Conveyance Is Valid. What you might call the 
backhanded type of statute, declares that the unrecorded convey-
ance shall be valid as against designated persons, and void as to 
all others. The enumeration of persons who can not take advantage 
of nonrecord always starts with the parties to the instrument, al-
ways adds other persons having notice (perhaps saying "actual 
notice"), often adds heirs and devisees of the parties, and some-
times (?) adds donees. Purchasers and creditors are never named. 
Now it is obvious that these statutes require drastic interpretation 
and they have received it. It has, for example, been uniformly 
(in the few decisions) held that they do not protect heirs, de-
visees or donees, even though such persons are not included in 
the enumeration. On the other hand, they clearly protect bona 
fide purchasers. The frame of the statute, escaping the use of the 
terms "good faith" and "purchaser," with their crystallized defin-
itions, might have let in a new and more inclusive concept of bona 
fide purchase, but the editor does not know to what extent, if at 
all, this has actually happened. Certainly much of the old learning 
has been read into the backhanded statute, and general discussions 
of the recording acts seldom distinguish cases on the basis of 
the two types of legislation. Yet, on any arguable question (for ex-
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ample, on a mortgage for an antecedent debt) a lawyer should 
not hesitate to argue for a liberal interpretation of this type 
of statute, distinguishing decisions under the other kind of 
legislation. 
What about creditors? Though some courts have denied them 
protection (in large part these decisions rest upon a reading of 
the recording act in conjunction with other statutory provisions 
touching the effect of judgments etc.) creditors are usually let in. 
Priority is, however, usually limited to those creditors who ac-
quire a lien by attachment, etc., in the interval of nonrecord. 
A word about that mortgage section of the Ohio statute. By 
the letter, the unrecorded mortgage is wholly inoperative, but that 
is strong meat. It seems to have been made clear in the decisions 
that the unrecorded mortgage is effective as against the mortgagor, 
and it is probably so as against his heirs, devisees and donees. 
There are decisions to the effect that it is ineffective as against pur-
chasers with notice, but would that be followed all the way down 
to actual knowledge? As to creditors, conveyancing ideas have 
again been at work. See annotation of the section in Page's Code. 
Nonrecord as Against Subsequent Suitors. A typical case: S 
files a bill to remove a cloud from his title to Blackacre created 
by levy of execution and sale. He makes defendant D, who was the 
levying creditor and purchaser at the execution sale, and who 
appears from the records to be still the owner of the interest, if 
any, resulting from that process. S gets a decree against D. Then he 
finds that, before the suit was commenced, D had executed a deed 
to E which was not recorded at the time S examined the record 
and brought suit. Under the common law, the decree is of no 
effect as against E. Do the recording acts make it effective? S's 
equities are, of course, strong. His change of position is much more 
seriOl!-S than that of a creditor who has merely levied an execution, 
though hardly equal to that of a purchaser. But we must look at the 
letter of the statutes. Here we find a radical difference between our 
two main types of legislation. The backhanded statutes never 
name suitors among those persons against whom the unrecorded 
conveyance is valid, and hence they cover these cases, or at least 
some of them-it will be understood that the cases are of many 
kinds and some nice questions arise. In fact the decisions have 
been quite as generous to suitors as one could hope. On the other 
hand, the statutes which name the persons who are to be protected 
can .not aid suitors unless they are specifically mentioned, 
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which they seldom are, or the courts give a strained interpretation 
to the words "purchaser" and "creditor," which they have seldom 
done. But, in this connection, attention should be given to the 
statutes concerning lis pendens, for in many states this chapter 
of the laws has been put in such shape as to reach the case in 
hand. If there is nothing but a "purchaser" statute to work with, 
might not estoppel help out the suitor who examined the record 
and made parties to his suit all whom he found to have an interest 
in the equity of redemption, then went on to judgment, and 
finally on the day of sale learned of the unrecorded deed and so 
could not become a bona fide purchaser?59 
CHATIEL R.EcoRDING AcTs 
We turn now to chattel recording ( or filing) acts. Very seldom 
do statutes provide for record of an absolute transfer, upon sale 
or gift, or of transfer in bailment or pledge. There are exceptions 
for particular types of chattel, e.g. registration of ships, and the 
now common system of certification of title to automobiles, but 
general provisions for miscellaneous chattel property are very 
rare. We began, however, more than a century ago, to require 
record or filing of chattel mortgages. It was natural enough to 
single out the mortgage, for this was the one type of chattel 
transaction in which a paper conveyance was an almost invariable 
feature. Today, chattel mortgage recording acts will doubtless be 
found in every state. In some states the recording system has been 
extended to other and newer forms of chattel security, such as 
the conditional sale and the trust receipt, but there has been 
little tendency to extend it to other than security transactions. 
Here, then, we see a marked difference between land and 
chattels in the type of conveyance which is subjected to the re-
cording system. Further divergence appears when we consider the 
persons who can take advantage of nonrecord, because "notice" 
has a different meaning in the two cases (e.g. as to lis pendens), 
and the chattel statutes almost (if not quite) always protect 
creditors as well as purchasers. Again, it seems to be commoner 
59 Cf. Marling v. Nommensen, 127 Wis. 363, 106 N.W. 844 (1906); and on the whole 
subject, see Durfee and Fleming, "Res Judicata and Recording Acts," 28 MICH L. REv. 
811 (1930). 
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here than in the case of land to protect those who gave credit 
to the debtor prior to the· recording, without regard to the time 
when they fixed a lien on the property. This difference is natural 
enough, in view of the limited scope of the chattel acts, which 
makes them look less like a conveyancing system, and in view 
of their background in the law of fraud. Finally, is not the prac-
tical effect of the chattel recording acts very different from that 
of the land recording acts? The former clearly give added protec-
tion to purchasers, and to creditors if they are in anywise affected 
by the legislation. As compared with the common law, the change 
is wholly in that direction. With the chattel acts, is not the effect 
precisely opposite? Do not these statutes impair the position 
of purchasers and creditors by permitting substitution of a formal 
record for the more notorious transfer of possession which was 
required by the common law? A sweeping answer to this question 
is inadvisable. Distinctions should be drawn-for example, be-
tween large transactions which will support the cost of examina-
tion of the record, and small transactions which will not. Further-
more, the precedent law of fraud should be closely scanned. Gen-
erally, it will be found that the recording system has one distinct 
advantage, from the point of view of creditor and purchaser, 
viz. that statute makes the unrecorded mortgage void, unless pos-
session is delivered to the mortgagee, whereas the law of fraud 
more often than not makes retention of possession mere evidence 
of fraud or raises a presumption of fraud which can be rebutted, 
and this is particularly true in the case of mortgage in contrast 
to sale. 
BONA FIDE PURCHASE BY THE SECOND HAND 
We have looked at a great variety of bona fide purchase prob-
lems, yet all the cases which we have discussed have the same 
outline. All can be described in these terms: 0 was owner of, 
or had some interest in, land or goods or chose in action; V, 
villain and vendor purported to sell the thing to P an innocent 
purchaser, or purported to charge the thing by mortgage or 
pledge or other security transaction in favor of P, or purported 
to create in P some other interest, less than absolute ownership; 
all under such conditions that, so far as concerns the relations 
between O and V, V had no power to make the transfer to P. 
In these cases, P never dealt with O in the purchase transaction. 
P was always what lawyers used to call "the third hand." May we 
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not have cases which are parallel in everything that goes to the 
"equities" of the parties, to the justice and policy of the case, 
yet do not involve the third hand feature? Suppose, for example, 
that V by fraud induces O to make a conveyance of land to P, 
who has no notice of the fraud and gives value, perhaps paying 
money to V as the consideration agreed to by O: is not P in at 
least as good a position to claim protection as he would have been 
if O had conveyed to V, under the same inducement, and V had 
then sold to P! Of course, he is, and the decisions will support 
him, though they may be reasoned, not in terms of bona fide 
purchase but in terms of the immateriality of third party fraud. 
Chattel cases have gone the same way.60 Duress by third persons 
has generally been dealt with in the same way as fraud of third 
persons. The common case is that of conveyance to satisfy or secure 
the liability of some member of the transferor's family for misap-
propriation of funds, the pressure being applied by the obligor, 
not by the creditor. In this situation, the transferor is sometimes 
let out under rules of illegality (compounding crime) or rules as 
to capacity of married women, etc. Perhaps these decisions have 
also been influenced by suspicion that the transferee knew of the 
duress, even though that was not proved.61 If there is any differ-
ence in the land and chattel cases between bona fide purchase 
by the third hand and bona fide purchase by the second hand, 
it seems to favor the latter. Note, for example, that in the duress 
cases referred to above the value was antecedent debt. 
The story becomes more interesting when we turn to choses 
in action. If V by fraud procures a promise by O to pay money, 
not in the form of a negotiable instrument, and then assigns the 
obligation to P, we have seen that bona fides and value will not 
enable P to get away from the dirt on V's shoes. But suppose V 
by fraud induces O to make a promise to P, for which P gives 
value without notice of the fraud-the commonest case is that of 
V inducing O to become his surety to P, who gives value to V. 
Can the fraud be set up as a defense to an action by P against O'! 
Answer, no.62 This can be fitted into the historical analysis which 
60 See 14 AM. & ENG. ENC., 2d ed., 154 (1900). 
61 See 4 A.L.R. 864, note (1919); 30 CoL. L. R.Ev. 714 (1930). 
62 ARANT, SURETYSHIP 80 (1931); 29 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 945; and see duress cases in 4 
A.L.R. 864, note (1919). 
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we developed for the third hand case, where P formerly coulq. 
not get a legal title to the obligation. In the second hand case, P 
would always have been regarded as legal owner of the obliga-
tion created by O's promise to him. If you are not satisfied with 
this historical reconciliation of the two lines of decision, and 
feel that they are in principle inconsistent, which of the two 
do you think is right? 
With these results in cases of land, goods, and non-negotiable 
choses in action, one might think he could reason a fortiori to the 
case of negotiable instruments, and so he could under the common 
law. But some courts, thinking that certain sections of N .LL 
mean that a payee of a negotiable instrument can not be a holder 
in due course, and at the same time overlooking the common law 
applicable to the case of the innocent payee of the non-negotiable 
obligation, have put the payee of the negotiable instrument into 
the worse position, mirabile dictu.63 
Surely, you will say, one who receives money, either for pres-
ent or antecedent value, without notice of false inducements 
arising from dealings between the payor and third persons, is in 
the clear. Yet, the payee of money is in the most difficult position of 
all. Perhaps it could be said that he usually succeeds, but his case 
is far from cock-simple. For these aberrations, various reasons can 
be found, in various cases, but there is one factor which is fairly 
common: payee's counsel does not recognize the bona fide pur-
chase aspect of the case, or does not get it before the court effec-
tively. Even if counsel fully understands the problem, he is in an 
awkward forensic position. The difficulty is that such cases ob-
viously fit the label "money paid under mistake" and slide easily 
into that thought groove, while they do not at all fit the label 
"bona fide purchase," except to one who has become well ac-
quainted with the artificiality of these terms, and so it requires 
very considerable professional skill to get these cases into the 
judge's bona fide purchase thought groove. 
MORAL 
We should not close this study of bona fide purchase without 
pointing the moral. Can we not assign definite reasons why our 
63 See Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course," 36 YALE L. J. 608 (1927); BRANNAN, 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW,. 5th ed., 487 (1932). 
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law has failed to give coherent answers to the questions of policy 
which are presented by these cases? It seems to the editor to be 
chiefly due to the fact that, in the period when this branch of 
the law was taking shape, the 18th and 19th centuries, lawyers 
and judges did not consider it their business to adopt the legislative 
attitude and shape the law on bases of policy. Policy had, we may 
assume, a great deal of influence on the decisions, but the influence 
was subconscious. Ideas of policy were not definitely organized 
nor fertilized by discussion. The reasons for decision which were 
thought worthy of argument were "legal reasons." That was, of 
course, a handicap. And it brought with it another disturbing 
factor. The unity of the subject was lost sight of, and various 
forms of the problem were approached from various angles as 
mere incidents of distinct departments of the law. With that, 
worked the inevitable tendency to insulate each department of 
legal doctrine, so that interpenetration of ideas was almost pre-
cluded. Such a comparative study of the materials as we have 
here indulged in was unknown. FinaIIy, we see the dictatorship of 
labels. Words are not only instruments of expression but also 
instruments of thought, and some psychologists assert that it is 
impossible for homo sapiens to rise to the level of wordless think-
ing. Whatever be the truth on that point, it is clear that certain 
features of the lawyer's business (e.g. the fact that he is concerned 
with rules of conduct which must be published, at least to the 
profession, if they are to be in any wise effective) make it next 
to impossible for him to think without words. And we lawyers 
have not fuIIy recognized the significance of words, with the 
result that they have had a glorious opportunity to become, not 
our servants but our masters. 
A prize is offered for the best substitute for "bona fide pur-
chase." But one of the rules of the contest is that the new term 
must consist of a word or words of common speech, fairly descrip-
tive of the fact situations with which the law of bona fide pur-
chase deals, because it is difficult to get lawyers to adopt any other 
sort of term. Even then, it will not be easy to seII the new term 
to the profession, for it is a true saying that it is easier to change 
the law than to change legal terminology. 
WHAT HAS BECOME OF LITTLE NEMO? 
Early in our discussion we propounded the maxim Qui Prior 
Est Tempore, etc., and the maxim Nemo Plus Juris, etc., as ex-
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pressing in different ways the primary canon of priority. Yet we 
have spent most of our time on sundry rules which defeat that 
canon. If you turn, now, to real legal literature, judicial opinions 
and text-books on property, contract, etc., you will find that the 
primary canon gets much less attention than we give it, and the 
opposing rules much more attention, being pursued into details 
which we have cheerfully ignored. 
Do you, then, conclude that the primary canon is not really 
primary? Is this another case of a general rule eaten up by ex-
ceptions, in the sense that the exceptions govern more cases than 
the general rule? No one has made a statistical study of that 
question, but you may profitably reflect upon it. 
